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Toward Aligning the Law with Biology?  The 
Federal Circuit’s About Face in Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.* 
John C. Stolpa** 
INTRODUCTION 
Advances in biotechnology offer great potential for the 
health and welfare of humankind.  As our knowledge of 
microscopic cellular processes and their relationship to the 
functioning of the body as a whole grows, so does the potential 
to develop new cures for a broad range of diseases.  Realization 
of this potential depends upon many factors, including how the 
courts apply existing patent doctrines to biological inventions.  
Scientists need to protect their discoveries adequately in order 
to encourage research and development, while businesses need 
a reliable intellectual property portfolio to attract investors.  
Both needs can be fulfilled by a patent system that is 
predictable and addresses the unique issues raised by 
biotechnology.  This fulfillment may necessitate a 
Congressional amendment of the patent laws for biological 
inventions and the promulgation of clear judicial rules in these 
matters. 
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.,1  the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals reached a decision that could signal 
that biotechnology presents novel issues for patent laws and 
that the current doctrines are inadequate.  The case centered 
on a patent2 owned by plaintiff Enzo Biochem, Inc. (Enzo) 
relating to DNA probes capable of specifically detecting the 

* This comment is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2004.  Ph.D. 
Microbiology and Immunology, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, 
2000.  B.A. Chemistry, The Colorado College, 1993. 
 1. 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Because two Federal Circuit cases 
share a common name, the initial decision, 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002), will 
be referred to as Enzo I, while the rehearing, 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 
will be denoted Enzo II. 
 2. See U.S. Patent No. 4,900,659 (issued Feb. 13, 1990). 
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bacteria that cause gonorrhea over the highly homologous 
bacteria responsible for meningitis.3  The precise sequences of 
the probes were not included in the patent specification, but 
they were described by their selective binding properties, and 
samples of the sequences were placed in a public depository.4  
Enzo brought an action for patent infringement against a group 
of biotechnology and pharmaceutical interests.5  The group 
subsequently moved for summary judgment that the claims 
were invalid for failure to meet the written description 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.6  The district 
court granted the motion. 7   A split Federal Circuit panel 
initially affirmed the decision (hereinafter Enzo I).8  However, 
just over three months later, the Federal Circuit abruptly 
vacated its former holding, reversed and remanded the district 
court’s ruling (hereinafter Enzo II), and denied a petition for 
rehearing en banc.9 
Two major issues are raised by the case, both relating to 
exactly what satisfies the written description requirement for 
biotechnology inventions.  The first issue is whether functional 
terms are sufficient to meet the written description 
requirement for biological inventions in general and DNA 
molecules specifically.10  This is an important point because the 
Federal Circuit had previously established an almost per se 
rule that only the exact sequence of a DNA molecule would 
provide an adequate written description.11  This exact-sequence 
rule is problematic, as it ignores the fact that biological 
inventions are not always amenable to purely structural 

 3. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1320-21. 
 4. See id.  Depositories such as the American Type Culture Collection 
(ATCC) maintain and propagate samples of biological materials (including 
DNAs, bacteria, and mammalian cells) submitted by scientists.  For a small 
maintenance fee, members of the scientific community may obtain these 
samples for their own research purposes.  See generally ATCC website, at 
http://www.atcc.org (explaining the depository principle and procedures, 
including deposits for patenting purposes) (last visited Mar. 11, 2003). 
 5. See Enzo I, 285 F.3d at 1016. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 1013. 
 9. See id.; see also Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1330. 
 10. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1328. 
 11. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating “[a]n adequate written description of a DNA . . . 
‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or 
physical properties’”) (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
1993)). 
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descriptions and many structurally distinct DNAs are 
functionally equivalent.  The Federal Circuit’s reversal may 
indicate a realization that this per se approach is untenable and 
functional aspects of biological inventions may be the means 
required to describe them adequately. 
The second issue is whether the purpose of the written 
description requirement is solely to prove that an inventor 
possessed the invention at the time of filing, or if the doctrine 
serves additional purposes for biological inventions.12   This 
issue is important because prior case law establishes that proof 
of possession of the invention satisfies the written description 
requirement in the non-biological arts.13  As such, an actual 
deposit of the material would seem to be the ideal way of 
establishing possession.  However, significant confusion 
surrounds whether a deposit, or the recitation of the DNA 
sequence in the specification, or both is required.  The Federal 
Circuit’s ruling in Enzo II suggests that a deposit, and 
therefore possession alone, is sufficient. 14   However, this 
conflicts with the Circuit’s earlier holding that the actual 
sequence must be delineated. 15   Failure to resolve this 
ambiguity will create uncertainty in biotechnology and could 
stifle research and development. 
This Comment will examine the current status of the 
written description requirement and analyze whether the 
Federal Circuit sufficiently clarified the issue in its Enzo II 
holding.  Section I will provide a basic lesson in biotechnology 
and will detail the evolution of the written description 
requirement as applied to biotechnology inventions.  Section II 
will describe the court’s two holdings and the rationales behind 
them.  Finally, Section III will critique these rationales.  This 
Comment concludes that although the court’s holding is a step 
in the right direction, significant confusion still surrounds the 
written description requirement.  Further, the Federal Circuit 
should extend their holding by ruling en banc that the 
disclosure requirement may be satisfied by enabling others to 

 12. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1329-30. 
 13. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (stating “the Patent Act and this court’s case law require only 
sufficient description to show one of skill in the refining art that the inventor 
possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing”). 
 14. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1326. 
 15. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1569 (holding that the description of a cDNA 
“requires a kind of specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of 
the sequence of nucleotides that make up the cDNA”). 
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make and use a DNA invention, rather than requiring the 
recitation of the DNA sequence, and that the disclosure 
requirement may be demonstrated by both functional and 
structural data. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. BIOTECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
“Biotechnology” is a catchall term, encompassing a vast 
array of technologies that continue to grow with each new 
discovery.  A relatively small number of technological areas 
have received most of the judicial focus, largely because issues 
related to these methodologies have been adjudicated by the 
Federal Circuit or its predecessor Court of Claims and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA).  The substances that have been addressed 
significantly by these courts include monoclonal antibodies,16 
antisense RNA, 17  and recombinant DNA technology. 18   For 
reasons elaborated below, this Comment will focus on problems 
best illustrated by recombinant DNA technology.  However, the 
arguments made here may be applied to other areas of 
biotechnology, or to any rapidly progressing technology. 
The genetic information of an organism is stored within 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a complex macromolecule located 
in the nucleus of each cell.19  The backbone of a single DNA 
strand is made up of a polymer of sugars, with each sugar 
bound to one nucleotide base.20  There are four bases in DNA 
designated A, T, C, and G.21  These bases are the “letters” of a 
molecular alphabet, and their specific arrangement encodes the 
data necessary for the functional characteristics of a cell and, in 
turn, an organism.22  DNA is maintained as a double helix of 
two complementary strands, as each base binds with a 

 16. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing 
monoclonal antibodies used in the diagnosis of Hepatitis B). 
 17. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (describing the use of antisense RNA to prevent ripening of FLAVR  
SAVR tomato). 
 18. See, e.g., In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing the 
method for producing mammalian polypeptides in plant cells). 
 19. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 335 
(Miranda Robertson et al. eds., 3d ed. 1994) (1983). 
 20. See id. at 98-99. 
 21. See id. The four bases are: Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Cytosine (C), 
and Guanine (G).  See id. 
 22. See id. at 102. 
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particular partner base: A always pairs with T and C always 
pairs with G. 23   Human genomic DNA is made up of 
approximately three billion of these base pairs, most of which 
have no known function.24  Specialized areas of the genome, the 
so-called genes, contain the information necessary for the 
production of the true building blocks of the cell-proteins.25 
To produce these proteins, a process known as 
transcription first occurs.26  In this process, DNA is used as a 
template to produce a faithful,27 though condensed,28 copy of the 
gene sequence. 29   This copied genetic information is then 
transported by single stranded molecules of messenger 
ribonucleic acid (mRNA) out of the nucleus to the cytoplasm 
where protein synthesis occurs.30 
In a process known as translation, each mRNA is used as a 
template for the construction of the protein encoded by the 
original gene sequence within the genomic DNA.31  The bases of 
each mRNA are sequentially “read” in groups of three, with 
each triplet referred to as a codon.32  Each codon specifies the 
incorporation of a specific amino acid into the nascent protein 
chain.33  This process continues until a special codon, known as 
a “stop codon,” is reached, terminating the building process and 
releasing the completed protein.34 
A degree of redundancy exists in the transfer of 
information from DNA to protein, leading to what is termed the 

 23. See id. at 99. 
 24. See id. at 339-40. 
 25. See id. at 104. 
 26. See id. at 104-05. 
 27. Slight modifications are made to the mRNA molecule.  The DNA base 
thymine (T) is substituted in each instance with the base uracil (U).  See id. at 
100.  In addition, a methylated cap structure is placed at the beginning (or 5’ 
end) and a series of adenine bases are added at the terminus (or 3’ end) of the 
mRNA molecule.  See id. at 368-69.  Despite these alterations, the essential 
coding sequence of the original DNA molecule is maintained.  See id. 
 28. Genes are composed of both protein-coding sequences known as exons 
interspersed with noncoding, regulatory regions know as introns.  See id. at 
105.  As mRNAs are processed, intron sequences are excised and exon 
sequences rejoined to one another by a catalytic process known as “splicing.”  
See id.  The resulting mRNA thus contains only the contiguous protein-coding 
regions and is thus shorter than the corresponding genomic DNA.  See id. 
 29. See id. at 104-05. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. at 106-07. 
 32. See id. at 106. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. at 234. 
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“degeneracy” of the genetic code.35  Although the four bases that 
comprise DNA can be arranged into sixty-four different 
codons, 36  there are only 20 amino acids employed in the 
manufacture of human proteins.37  Therefore, most of the amino 
acids are encoded by multiple unique codons.38  As a result, a 
scientist in possession of the nucleotide sequence of a particular 
gene can readily determine the corresponding protein 
sequence.39  Possession of a protein sequence, however, does not 
allow a researcher to define the exact gene sequence that 
encodes that protein.40 
B. RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY 
Recombinant DNA techniques provide a convenient means 
to produce large amounts of a particular protein. 41   This 
technique is important both for researching the function of a 
given protein and in the industrial production of the protein for 
therapeutic use in plants, humans, and animals.42 
mRNA molecules expressed by a cell can be isolated and 
converted into a DNA copy by using a viral enzyme in a process 
called reverse transcription.43  The resulting DNA molecules 
contain only the protein-coding sequences of genes, and are 
referred to as complementary DNAs (cDNAs).44  Once the cDNA 
for a gene is isolated, it may be connected with additional 
pieces of DNA that promote its transcription.45  The resulting 
construct is a compact DNA molecule free from the regulatory 
DNA elements that normally control the rate of its 
transcription. 46   This molecule may then be inserted into 
various cell types, ranging from bacteria to cultured 

 35. See id. at 230-31. 
 36. Three of which are “stop codons.”  Id. at 234. 
 37. See id. at 46. 
 38. See id. at 230-31.  Of the twenty amino acids, only two, methionine 
and tryptophan, are encoded solely by a single codon.  Id. at 231. 
 39. See id. at 106. 
 40. See id. at 314. 
 41. See generally id. at 291-334 (explaining how recombinant DNA 
technology has generated new experimental approaches that have 
revolutionized cell biology). 
 42. See id. at 291. 
 43. See id. at 310. 
 44. See id. at 310-11. 
 45. See id. at 320-21. 
 46. Id. 
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mammalian cell lines.47  These cells are then harnessed as tiny 
factories: large volumes of the cells are grown and the protein 
is isolated from the milieu by conventional purification 
techniques.48  The isolated proteins have myriad uses, including 
the treatment of human diseases.49 
Isolated DNA molecules may also be used as probes to 
detect the presence of a specific DNA sequence within a larger 
DNA molecule, such as a bacterial genome.50  In this process, 
the double stranded genomic DNA is first separated into single 
strands by heating, then allowed to cool in the presence of the 
single stranded probe DNA.51  The probe will preferentially 
anneal to its complementary sequence if it is present in the 
genomic DNA sample.52  If the probe is derived from a sequence 
unique to the genome of a particular bacterial strain, it may be 
used to identify the presence of that strain over a similar 
bacterium.53 
The explosion of genomic and proteomic research has 
provided a wealth of sequence data for researchers to 
decipher.54  With the Human Genome Project fundamentally 
completed, it is now possible to scan the entire human genome 
for potential gene-encoding sequences.55  The protein sequences 
encoded by these genes will soon be determined and added to 
the growing list of proteins whose structures are known, but 
whose functions are not.56  Researchers will then face the task 
of discovering functions for these “orphan” protein sequences.57 
A moderately skilled researcher can employ modern DNA 
techniques to readily alter the sequences of isolated cDNAs 
molecules.58  This fact, combined with the inherent degeneracy 
of the genetic code, allows the rapid creation of many unique 

 47. Id. at 321. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. at 300. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Stanley Fields, Proteomics: Proteomics in Genomeland, 291 
SCIENCE 1221, 1221 (2001).  Proteomics refers to the study and manipulation 
of the set of proteins expressed within a particular cell type.  See id. 
 55. See J.C. Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 
SCIENCE 1304, 1306 (2001). 
 56. See Fields, supra note 54, at 1221. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See ALBERTS, supra note 19, at 323. 
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cDNAs that encode the same protein sequence.59  Thousands of 
DNA molecules with unique chemical structures exist that, 
when transcribed and translated, all produce exactly the same 
protein.60 
C. THE PATENT SYSTEM 
The importance of patents to the development of an 
industrialized society has been understood in the United States 
since its very inception.  This realization is manifest in the 
Constitutional mandate authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.” 61   The first Congress 
exercised this power immediately by adopting the Patent Act of 
1790.62 
Though the patent laws are frequently amended, the goals 
behind them have changed little since 1790.63  The laws grant a 
time-limited monopoly to an inventor as a reward for the 
discovery and its disclosure to the public.64  The Supreme Court 
recently described the patent system as “a carefully crafted 
bargain that encourages both the creation and the public 
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology.”65  Thus, 
the patent system seeks to promote public access to 
technological advances and to reward the inventors who 
discover them.66 
In general, an invention is patentable if it is useful, novel 

 59. See id. at 323-34. 
 60. See id. at 106 (showing potential combinations of nucleotides encoding 
each amino acid). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 62. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-12 (1790).  See generally 
Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 269 (1995). 
 63. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (3d ed. 2002) (noting “the 1952 Patent Act, the first 
major revision of the patent statute since the nineteenth century, restated 
many of the fundamental principles on which American patent law had been 
based since 1790”). 
 64. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest 
as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 398 
(2002). 
 65. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (citing Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)). 
 66. See Saunders, supra note 64, at 398. 
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and nonobvious. 67   In addition, the invention must be 
adequately disclosed in an application filed with and examined 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).68  
The specification of the patent application must sufficiently set 
out the details of the invention such that the public may take 
advantage of its merits after the patent term expires.69 
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH 
The text of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 sets forth 
the substantive disclosure requirements that must be met for 
the issuance of a patent.70  In essence, this section delineates 
what information about the invention must be included in the 
specification to entitle the inventor to the patent.71  It provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
72
 
The written description and enablement requirements of § 
112, paragraph 1 are quite intertwined.73  Disclosures sufficient 
to meet one requirement often provide enough to satisfy the 
other.  Despite this, the Federal Circuit has held that written 
description and enablement are two separate requirements, 
and failure to satisfy either can result in the invalidation of a 
patent.74 
E. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
The origin of the written description requirement can be 
traced back to the original Patent Act of 1793 when an 

 67. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2002). 
 68. See id. §§ 111-112. 
 69. See id. § 112. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (stating in reference to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1: “[t]he purpose 
of the description requirement of this paragraph is to state what is needed to 
fulfill the enablement criteria.  These requirements may be viewed separately, 
but they are intertwined.”) 
 74. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that for a disclosure to be adequate under 35 U.S.C. § 112, it must 
have “a ‘written description of the invention’ which is separate and distinct 
from the enablement requirement.”). 
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adequate description of an invention was all that provided the 
public with notice of an invention’s scope.75   In 1822, the 
Supreme Court succinctly stated that, in addition to 
enablement, the object of the disclosure was to “put the public 
in possession of what the party claims as his own invention, so 
as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in common 
use. . . .”76  This notice function, however, was soon obviated 
when a requirement for claims was added to the Patent Act in 
1870.77  For the next century, a disclosure was adequate if it 
enabled one of skill to make and use the invention.78 
The long-dormant written description requirement was 
given new life in 1967 when the CCPA decided In re Ruschig.79  
In Ruschig, a claim was added to a patent application one year 
after its filing. 80   The court held that the specification 
sufficiently enabled one skilled in the art to practice the 
invention contained in the late claim.81  Despite this, the court 
invalidated the late claim, ruling that an adequate written 
description is required to prove that the applicant actually 
possessed the invention as of the filing date.82  Thus, a new 
purpose for the written description requirement was born: a 
means to reject claims added after filing that are not supported 
by the disclosure contained within the originally filed 
specification.  Since 1967, the written description requirement 
has served as the statutory basis for establishing the priority 
dates to which individual claims are entitled.83 
While both cases were decided on other grounds, the 
Federal Circuit reached two decisions establishing key patent 
principles for biological inventions that would have serious 
ramifications for the written description requirement.84  The 
first decision considered genus claims to a series of 

 75. See id. at 1560-61. 
 76. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822). 
 77. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written 
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 615, 620 (1998). 
 78. See id. at 620-21. 
 79. 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 80. See id. at 991. 
 81. Id. at 996. 
 82. See id. at 995-96. 
 83. See Mueller, supra note 77, at 620-21. 
 84. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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recombinant DNAs.85  Researchers at Amgen had cloned the 
human gene for erythropoietin (EPO), a protein useful for 
treating anemia by stimulating red blood cell production in the 
bone marrow.86  The patent at issue in the case claimed all 
DNAs capable of encoding a protein with an amino acid 
sequence similar to EPO such that the protein produced from 
the DNA possessed EPO-like activity.87  The court invalidated 
this claim for lack of enablement 88  because it potentially 
covered millions of EPO analogs while disclosing the properties 
of only a few.89 
The second decision, Fiers v. Revel, came by way of a 
priority determination in an appeal from an interference 
proceeding.90  In Fiers, the respondent Revel tried to establish a 
priority date for a human DNA claim by stating that the DNA 
was part of the invention and providing a method by which it 
could be isolated.91  The court rejected this argument and 
reasoned that a DNA claim must be limited to its precise 
sequence, or “a description of the DNA itself.”92  The court then 
elaborated that an adequate description required conception, 
and that “a conception of a DNA requires a precise definition, 
such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical 
properties. . . .”93  The ruling suggested that a DNA claim could 
be invalidated for failure to include its exact sequence, even if 
the inventor otherwise properly enabled the invention by 
teaching how to obtain the DNA. 

 85. 927 F.2d at 1203. 
 86. Id. at 1200.  “Genus” claims are those directed towards a family of 
items, rather than just a single family member, or “species.”  See Hugh 
McTavish, Note, Enabling Genus Patent Claims to DNA, MINN. INTELL. PROP. 
REV., Vol.2 No.1, 121, at 121-22. 
 87. See 927 F.2d at 1204.  Claim 7 reads as follows: 
A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA 
sequence encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid sequence 
sufficiently duplicative of that of erythropoietin to allow possession of 
the biological property of causing bone marrow cells to increase 
production of reticulocytes and red blood cells, and to increase 
hemoglobin synthesis or iron uptake. 
Id. 
 88. See infra Part I.F. 
 89. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1214 (“It is not sufficient, having made the 
gene and a handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained, 
to claim all possible genetic sequences that have EPO-like activity.”). 
 90. See 984 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 91. See id. at 1170. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1171. 
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Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & 
Company seemingly confirmed that the chemical structure 
(sequence) of a DNA molecule is required to meet the written 
description requirement. 94   In Eli Lilly, scientists at the 
University of California cloned the cDNA for rat insulin; the 
sequence of which was included in the specification of a 
subsequent patent. 95   In addition, the specification also 
included the amino acid sequence of the human insulin protein 
and a method for cloning and obtaining the sequence of the 
human insulin gene.96  It was further known that the amino 
acid sequences of insulin proteins are well conserved among 
diverse species and that non-human insulin was functional in 
the treatment of human diabetes patients.97 
The patent at issue in Eli Lilly claimed not only the rat 
insulin cDNA, but also the human insulin cDNA.98  In affirming 
the invalidation of the human insulin cDNA claim, the Federal 
Circuit reiterated the dual standards of the written description 
requirement suggested in Fiers.99  According to the court, the 
University of California had not proved that it possessed the 
claimed invention nor had it adequately described the DNA 
molecule itself by structure, formula, chemical name, or 
physical properties. 100   The description of what a DNA or 
protein does, in terms of function or result, was held 
insufficient; the molecule itself must be described.101 
The Eli Lilly decision sparked a rigorous debate amongst 
commentators, many of who were critical of the Federal 
Circuit’s doctrinal expansion. 102   The heightened written 

 94. 119 F.3d 1559, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 95. See id. at 1562-63. 
 96. Id. at 1567. 
 97. See Zhibin Ren, Note, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written 
Description Requirement and Regents of the University of California v. Eli 
Lilly & Company, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1297, 1305-06 (1999). 
 98. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 99. Id. at 1568-69 (holding “[t]hus, as we have previously held, a cDNA is 
not defined or described by the mere name ‘cDNA,’ even if accompanied by the 
name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of specificity usually 
achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that make 
up the cDNA.”); see Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 100. 119 F.3d at 1568. 
 101. Id.  It is important to note that the claims at issue in Eli Lilly were 
original claims; the court was not attempting to determine at what date the 
disclosure supported added claims.  Thus, the written description doctrine was 
being applied as a substantive disclosure requirement.  See id. 
 102. See e.g., Mueller, supra note 77, at 651-52 (arguing that inventors will 
delay filing applications until the precise structure of the DNA components of 
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description requirement for biotech inventions has been decried 
as a “super-enablement” standard, largely because the amount 
of detail required to satisfy the new written description 
requirement will almost certainly be enabling.103  The written 
description requirement after Eli Lilly now potentially serves 
the following purposes: (1) to demonstrate possession of a 
claimed invention in priority disputes; (2) to convey all the 
details of an invention to facilitate enablement; and (3) to be a 
general measure of the adequacy of a disclosure independent of 
enablement.  In addition, an implied purpose of the written 
description requirement is to allow for the examination of a 
patent by the PTO.104 
In an effort to conform its examination procedures to 
Federal Circuit precedent, the PTO issued “Written Description 
Guidelines” (Guidelines) on January 5, 2001.105  The Guidelines 
make a clear distinction between technologies that are new and 
unpredictable and those that are established. 106   Separate 
requirements are outlined for each. 107   For predictable 
technologies, the written description requirement is satisfied by 
the disclosure of the invention’s function and its method of 
production. 108   This is not so for younger, and hence 
unpredictable, fields; a higher level of disclosure is needed.109  
“[A] clear depiction of the invention in detailed drawings or in 
structural chemical formulas” is also required for the 
unpredictable arts—a level of precision that strongly implies 
only a full structure will be satisfactory.110 
The Guidelines are heavily focused on the biotechnology 
realm and provide many examples applicable to DNA and 
protein inventions.111  The Guidelines state that disclosure of 
the amino acid sequence of a given protein satisfies the written 

the invention are known, thus hindering public access to cutting-edge 
technologies). 
 103. See id. at 633. 
 104. See Enzo I, 285 F.3d at 1027 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 105. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 
U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 
2001) [hereinafter “Guidelines”]. 
 106. See id. at 1106. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 1105. 
 111. See generally id. 
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description requirement for all cDNAs encoding that protein.112  
The PTO also allows descriptions of DNAs and proteins based 
on percentage of sequence identity with another known 
sequence. 113   Finally, for genus claims, 114  a “representative 
number of species” must be adequately described in compliance 
with the Guidelines’ other requirements. 115   This can be 
achieved if the species described are indicative of the properties 
claimed for the entire genus.116  This principle suggests that the 
PTO is willing to consider claims to slight variants of disclosed 
sequences that possess the same function. 
F. THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT 
The enablement doctrine ensures that an inventor’s claim 
scope is commensurate with the actual invention that is 
disclosed. 117   In order to enable properly, a patent must 
adequately teach a skilled artisan how to fully make and use 
the invention. 118   Enablement is traditionally assessed in 
biotechnology cases by determining whether the invention may 
be made and used without “undue experimentation.”119  The 
enablement standard has varied little over the last few 
decades, and satisfaction of the enablement requirement is a 
question of law.120 
In In re Wands,121 the Federal Circuit listed eight factors 
for courts to consider when determining if a disclosed 
invention’s use required “undue experimentation.” 122   The 

 112. See id. at 1111 n.57. 
 113. Cf. id. at 1104 (explaining that “possession may be shown . . . by 
describing distinguishing identifying characteristics sufficient to show that the 
applicant was in possession of the claimed invention”). 
 114. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 115. Guidelines, supra note 105, at 1106. 
 116. Id. at 1106. 
 117. See McTavish, supra note 86, at 124-25. 
 118. See e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting that “[t]o be enabling under § 112, a 
patent must contain a description that enables one skilled in the art to make 
and use the claimed invention”). 
 119. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (stating “[t]hat some experimentation is necessary does not constitute a 
lack of enablement; the amount of experimentation, however, must not be 
unduly extensive”). 
 120. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (listing enablement cases). 
 121. 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 122. See id. at 737. 
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Wands factors are: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of 
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of 
working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the 
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability 
or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
123
 
Acknowledging that inventions in highly technical fields 
may require substantial amounts of work to reproduce, the 
Wands court clarified that the focus of the inquiry should be on 
what is “undue,” and not on “experimentation.”124  A patentee 
need not provide detailed instructions on methods that are 
routine in the field. 125   The invention need not be 
understandable by the general public to be properly enabled.126  
Rather, a person having ordinary skill in the art (a 
“PHOSITA” 127 ) must be capable of making and using the 
invention.128  In the field of biotechnology, a PHOSITA is a 
Ph.D.-level scientist.129 
II. CASE DESCRIPTION 
A proper understanding of the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. requires that the facts of 
the case be more thoroughly elaborated.  Enzo’s patent claimed 
DNA probes that specifically bound the genomic DNA from the 
bacteria responsible for gonorrhea over that of the bacteria that 
causes meningitis.130  These two bacterial strains are between 
eighty and ninety-three percent homologous.131  The claims 
were structured in terms of binding ratios between the two 
strains when the probes were employed in a hybridization 
assay.132  Although the patent application did not include the 
sequences of the DNA probes, three DNA sequences were 
deposited with the ATCC,133 a public biological depository.134  

 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Calgene, 188 F.3d at 1373-74. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See generally, Joseph P. Meara, Comment, Just Who is the Person 
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art?  Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002) (discussing generally the judiciary’s use of the 
PHOSITA standard). 
 128. See Calgene, 188 F.3d at 1373. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,900,659, supra note 2. 
 131. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1320. 
 132. See id. at 1321-22. 
 133. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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Claims were drawn to these three sequences, as well as 
“discrete nucleotide subsequences thereof” and “mutated 
discrete nucleotide sequences of any of the foregoing inserts 
that are within said hybridization ratio and subsequences 
thereof.”135  Thus, the substance of the invention is any DNA 
sequence that binds to the chromosomal DNA of the two 
bacteria within a specified range.136 
In reaching its initial decision affirming the invalidity of 
the patent, the Federal Circuit woodenly applied the “biotech” 
written description doctrine synthesized in Eli Lilly.137  The 
court reiterated the rule that the “adequate written description 
of genetic material ‘requires a precise definition, such as by 
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical 
properties’. . . .”138  The court then found that the disclosure of 
the probe’s ability to bind specifically to one bacterial genome 
was not a “chemical property” of the probe and was thus 
inadequate.139  These data were merely functional, and “[a] 
description of what the genetic material does, rather than of 
what it is, does not suffice.”140  The simple fact, that the precise 
DNA sequences were not recited in the specification, 
established a per se failure to satisfy the requirement.141  The 
court went on to hold that functional disclosure did not satisfy 
the PTO Guidelines, and that these Guidelines were not 
binding upon the court anyway.142  Finally, the court ruled that 
while a deposit may satisfy the enablement requirement, it is 
not an adequate substitute for a written description.143 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk disagreed with the 
majority’s holding that the sequence of a DNA molecule was per 
se required to meet the written description requirement.144  He 
pointed out that reaching such a conclusion as a matter of law 
was inappropriate since “the written description requirement 

 134. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1326. 
 135. Id. at 1322. 
 136. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,900,659, supra note 2. 
 137. See Enzo I, 285 F.3d 1013, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 138. Id. at 1018 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 
F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 
(Fed. Cir. 1993))). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568). 
 141. See id. at 1021. 
 142. See id. at 1019. 
 143. See id. at 1021-22. 
 144. See id. at 1024-25. 
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presents a factual issue.”145  Accordingly, the correct inquiry 
should be “whether one of ordinary skill in the art would 
consider the specification to describe the claimed invention.”146  
Judge Dyk reasoned that if selective hybridization is 
sufficiently indicative of a DNA structure in the view of experts 
in the field, then the law should also be satisfied.147  The dissent 
also concluded that public deposit of biological materials is an 
ideal way to meet the written description’s primary purpose of 
public notice of the patent’s claim scope.148  Judge Dyk also 
rejected the majority’s claim that a secondary purpose of the 
written description requirement— allowing for efficient 
examination by the PTO— was not met.149  He noted that the 
examiner had not rejected the claims for failure to comply with 
the written description requirement, and that the PTO 
encourages applicants to use depositories to satisfy §112, 
paragraph 1 requirements. 150   In conclusion, the dissent 
reflected that the policy endorsed by the majority was unfair to 
the applicant who, finding no statutory or PTO bar, relies on a 
public deposit.151 
On petition for rehearing, the Federal Circuit abruptly 
vacated its earlier decision and summarily reversed the 
insufficiency of deposited material. 152   The court held that 
“reference in the specification to deposits of nucleotide 
sequences describes those sequences sufficiently to the public 
for purposes of meeting the written description requirement.”153  
The claims directed to the deposited sequences themselves, 
including the bacterial genomes used in the hybridization 
protocol, were thus held to be adequately described.154  Whether 
this was also true for the generic claims to subsequences and 
mutations of the deposited sequences was a question of fact 

 145. Id. at 1024. 
 146. Id. at 1026. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 1027. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 1027-28. 
 151. See id. at 1029. 
 152. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 153. Id. at 1326.  The court added “we hold that reference in the 
specification to a deposit in a public depository, which makes its contents 
accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in written form, 
constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to 
comply with the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.”  Id. at 1325 
(emphasis added). 
 154. See id. at 1326, 1328. 
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that could be answered only on remand.155  The district court 
was instructed to “determine whether a person of skill in the 
art would glean from the written description, including 
information obtainable from the deposits of the claimed 
sequences, subsequences, mutated variants, and mixtures 
sufficient to demonstrate possession of the generic scope of the 
claims.”156 
The Federal Circuit also conceded that not “all functional 
descriptions of genetic material fail to meet the written 
description requirement.”157  The court then adopted the PTO 
Guidelines’ standard that the written description may be met 
by disclosure of “functional characteristics when coupled with a 
known or disclosed correlation between function and 
structure.”158  The court held that ability of a DNA probe to 
selectively bind another DNA sequence may be sufficiently 
indicative of the probe’s structure to satisfy the written 
description requirement.159  The decision raised the possibility 
that the hybridization function of DNA probes, by itself, might 
not adequately describe probes generated from the deposited 
sequences.160  The rationale was that the specification did not 
include the specific location on the bacterial DNA where the 
probes bound. 161   Nonetheless, the court ruled that the 
determination was a question of fact.162  If one of skill in the art 
would find the “disclosure of the hybridization function and an 
accessible structure” satisfactory, then the court would as 
well.163 
Because an en banc hearing is required to do so,164 the 
Federal Circuit did not expressly overrule Eli Lilly.165  The 
implicit per se rule against functional descriptions was 
dispelled; the court subtly altered its interpretation of Eli Lilly, 

 155. See id. at 1326-27. 
 156. Id. at 1327. 
 157. Id. at 1324. 
 158. Id. at 1324-25 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 105, at 1106). 
 159. See id. at 1324-25. 
 160. See id. at 1328. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Campa v. United States, 300 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(noting “[a]s with all parties seeking to overturn the precedent of our court, 
Plaintiffs would likely need to seek en banc consideration of this issue”) (citing 
FED. CIR. R. 35(a) (“[o]nly the court en banc may overrule a binding 
precedent”)). 
 165. See Enzo II, 296 F.3d at 1330. 
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stating, “[a] description of what a material does, rather than of 
what it is, usually does not suffice.”166  Further, the court 
maintained that the written description requirement is not 
necessarily met solely by possession of the invention. 167  
Possession is thus but one inquiry, and will fail to satisfy the 
written description requirement if “the specification does not 
adequately describe the claimed invention.”168  Compliance thus 
requires both the deposit itself and the recitation of the 
accession number of the deposit in the specification.169 
III.ANALYSIS 
A. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT AFTER ENZO II 
After Eli Lilly, inventors were certain of one thing: the 
written description requirement for a DNA molecule was 
satisfied by the recitation of its exact sequence.170  Enzo II 
purports to provide additional means by which inventors might 
also meet this goal.171  Although this appears to be a concession 
to biologists, a significant gap is left between what might 
satisfy the requirement and what actually does provide an 
adequate written description. 
Exactly what disclosure will now satisfy the written 
description requirement is unclear.  On top of that, it appears 
as if a significant division exists amongst the Federal Circuit 
Judges themselves regarding the contours of the doctrine.172  
Patent prosecutors are thus left in the uncomfortable position 
of having to craft applications that meet the PTO’s conception 
of written description, yet may not withstand future scrutiny in 
the courts.  Despite the Federal Circuit’s apparent doctrinal 
softening in the rehearing of Enzo, it is important to realize 
that much of the doctrine created in Eli Lilly remains good 
law.173  This section attempts to explain the current contours of 

 166. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. at 1330. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 152-163 and accompanying text. 
 172. See generally, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, 42 Fed. Appx. 439 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (laying out the Federal Circuit judges’ arguments for and 
against rehearing the case en banc). 
 173. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text. 
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the written description requirement. 
1. Possession 
The Enzo II decision upholds the conventional doctrine 
that the primary purpose of the written description 
requirement is to demonstrate possession of the claimed 
invention. 174   As held in Eli Lilly, this extends beyond 
determining if a patent’s specification can adequately support 
amended claims; possession must also be demonstrated for 
original claims.175  Making a biological deposit may now be used 
to demonstrate possession, but this is contingent on the 
accession number of the deposit being recited in the 
specification. 176   Although functional data indicative of a 
particular structure may now be used to demonstrate 
possession, the focus of the inquiry remains the physical 
possession of a DNA molecule itself.177 
Merely showing physical possession of a DNA molecule, 
however, will not satisfy the written description requirement.178  
Enzo certainly possessed the claimed subsequences, as they are 
inherently parts of the deposited probes.179  Under the Enzo II 
holding, something more is required: an inventor must also be 
able to sufficiently communicate possession to others. 180  
However, meeting this burden is where the controversy begins. 
2. Substantive Description 
In addition to proof of possession, the Enzo II court 
requires that the specification provide a substantive description 
of the invention so that one skilled in the art would recognize 
its structure and limitations.181  This requirement is wholly 
separate from possession, and is likewise unique to 
biotechnology inventions.  A DNA must be described in such 
terms that one can develop a mental picture of the molecule.  
The critical question in this inquiry is not “do I think you have 
the invention?” Rather, it is “have you adequately captured the 
invention in words?”  In accord with Eli Lilly, this inquiry 

 174. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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comprises a substantive disclosure requirement for purposes of 
patentability. 182   Although a biological deposit may also 
adequately describe an invention to satisfy this disclosure 
requirement, there are several caveats.  For example, a 
biological deposit alone may not be sufficient if the court 
believes that the invention could have been captured solely 
with words or sequences.183 
Therefore, in the case of a single DNA molecule, recitation 
of the precise DNA sequence or reference to a deposit in an 
accessible biological repository will satisfy the written 
description requirement.184  The unsettled issue is what level of 
disclosure will meet the written description requirement for 
claims to sequences derived from the deposited probes.  
Notwithstanding the use of functional descriptions, 185  it is 
difficult to imagine how claims to subsequences such as Enzo’s 
can meet this standard without placing a near impossible 
burden on the applicant.  The specification would need to 
contain either a systematic listing of every potential DNA 
subsequence, or a deposit of each and every claimed sequence 
would need to be made.  Neither of these options is practical 
when more than a handful of sequences are claimed. 
The scope of exactly what must be adequately described is 
also an open issue.  Will it be fatal if an inventor fails to 
adequately describe a process or entity that he wrongly believes 
is common in the art?  The inventor must also consider that 
future experts looking back to the technology present on the 
filing date will judge the descriptions.  Thus, it might be wise to 
discuss relatively new techniques in great detail to compensate 
for the margin of error inherent in hindsight analyses.  It also 
appears that in addition to the quality of the information 
contained within a figure, an inventor will be judged on the 
ability of the figure to communicate the importance of the data.  
The inventor not only must generate sufficient data to support 
the invention, but must also present the data in such a manner 
that the reader will understand how it relates to the claims of 
the invention. 
3. The Adequacy of Functional Data 
Enzo II marks the first time the Federal Circuit has 

 182. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
 183. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 184. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 185. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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allowed functional rather than purely structural data to be 
considered towards fulfilling the possession and substantive 
description requirements discussed above. 186   Importantly, 
functional descriptions must still focus on what the inventor 
possesses, not what she has enabled.187  Although the court 
opened the door to the use of functional data to meet the 
written description requirement, the court failed to provide 
guidance on exactly what will be viewed as adequate. 
In fact, the court suggested that hybridization data would 
only be sufficient if the complementary sequence bound by the 
probe is disclosed.188  This suggestion is, at best, a mixed 
blessing for inventors.  On the one hand, it opens up the 
possibility that one may claim all DNA probes that bind to a 
precisely defined DNA sequence, without the need to specify all 
the possible sequences of the probes.  On the other hand, this 
claim still requires that the sequence of the target DNA be 
disclosed, which might be just as limiting as requiring the 
sequence of the probe in the first place.   
Because of their adoption by the court, 189  the PTO 
Guidelines provide a least one embodiment of the new standard 
for acceptable functional data.190  The Guidelines state that 
functional definitions are allowable when “coupled with a 
known or disclosed correlation between function and 
structure.”191  While this standard sounds good in principle, its 
practical application is uncertain.  The statement articulates 
that functional data is acceptable in certain circumstances, yet 
fails to define those scenarios.  How strong must the correlation 
be?  Must the functional data be indicative of the precise DNA 
structure at the nucleotide level?  The language suggests that 
only functional data directly dependent on a known DNA 
sequence is acceptable, a concession akin to allowing a 
photocopy of a document to replace the original.  The 
requirement thus remains dependent on the actual structure of 
the DNA molecule, with allowances made for the manner in 
which the sequence can be illustrated. 
A reasonable reading of the decision might lead one to 
speculate that data indicative of DNA structure may suffice, 

 186. See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra notes 105-116 and accompanying text. 
 191. Guidelines, supra note 105, at 1106. 
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but that this extension is probably limited to data from which 
the sequence can be deduced with near-absolute precision.  In 
other words, alternate ways of describing the sequence, 
provided one knows the exact sequence, may be an adequate 
proxy for the true sequence.  Examples might include a 
restriction map coupled with the number of nucleotides, or the 
sequence of a DNA probe with which the claimed DNA 
hybridizes.192  For example, if the scientific community knows 
that a particular protein can bind only to a precise DNA 
sequence, then an inventor may include the ability of a DNA to 
bind the protein to satisfy, at least partially, the written 
description requirement. 
As in Enzo II, providing sufficient written description to 
support a claim to a genus of DNAs is a concern for inventors.193  
Assuming, arguendo, that the Federal Circuit adopted the 
complete PTO Guidelines for meeting the written description194 
rather than restricting it to the facts of the case, additional 
data may constitute sufficient disclosure for genus claims.195  Of 
particular interest is the PTO Guidelines’ suggestion that the 
disclosure of a protein sequence may adequately support all 
possible DNAs that encode the protein.196  It remains unclear, 
however, if the Federal Circuit has adopted the full extent of 
the PTO Guidelines. 
B. PRUNING BACK THE HEIGHTENED WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
In the inherently unpredictable biotechnology field, the 
primary issue remains; what is the proper standard for 
defining the scope of biological inventions.197  In Enzo II, the 
Federal Circuit continues to place too much emphasis on the 

 192. See Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35 
U.S.C. § 112(1): The Standard After Regents of the University of California v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV. 537, 555 (1999). 
 193. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. 
 194. This is merely a supposition at this point, as the court was ambiguous 
in its holding.  In reference to the description of DNA probes by preferential 
binding, the court stated, “[w]e are persuaded by the Guidelines on this point 
and adopt the PTO’s applicable standard for determining compliance with the 
written description requirement.”  Enzo II, 296 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (emphasis added). 
 195. See supra text accompanying notes 111-116. 
 196. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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primary structure of a DNA.198  Despite making allowances for 
the use of functional data, the focus on adequate 
communication of possession rather than on what the 
disclosure teaches the public is the real problem.  Removing the 
heightened written description requirement for biotechnology 
will bring the patent laws in accord with basic biological 
principles while providing clarity and certainty by employing 
the well-established enablement standard.199 
By simply remanding the case to determine if the genus of 
subsequences was “possessed” by Enzo,200 the court missed an 
opportunity to clarify the law.  The court should have agreed to 
an en banc rehearing of the Enzo I decision and overruled the 
heightened written description requirement created by Eli 
Lilly.201  In addition, the court should have held that, when 
applied to original claims, the written description requirement 
is satisfied if it coveys enough information to enable a 
PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention.  In other 
words, the enablement doctrine should be the sole standard for 
judging the adequacy of a patent’s disclosure.  The written 
description requirement should only maintain a distinct role in 
determining priority dates for amended claims, consistent with 
the holding in Vas-Cath.202 
1. Biotechnology Realities 
By focusing the district court on the adequacy of the 
disclosure’s descriptive qualities, rather than upon what the 
disclosure enabled a PHOSITA to accomplish, the Enzo II court 
fashioned a law in conflict with basic principles of biology.203  
The patented invention at issue in the Enzo decisions is more 
than just a particular piece of DNA for which every 
embodiment may be easily described and physically possessed.  
The value of the invention is the identification of unique areas 
of a bacterial genome that can be used as probes.204  The Enzo II 
court ignored the heart of the invention by focusing on 
technical possession and description,205 neither of which is an 

 198. See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 168. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 130-132. 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 167-169. 
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accurate measure of the invention’s scope. 
Further, if its claims are denied on remand, Enzo will be in 
the paradoxical situation of having enabled the use of 
subsequences derived from its probes, yet will not be entitled to 
claims covering the subsequences.  A scientist needs no special 
skills to select and make use of a smaller nucleotide 
subsequence within those disclosed by Enzo.206  Thus, the Enzo 
II court’s rule can frequently reward the ordinary technician 
who learns from and exploits aspects of a patentee’s 
unprotected invention. 
Focusing solely on the chemical structure of a protein or 
DNA molecule belies its true nature.  A DNA molecule is often 
useful not merely due to its nucleotide sequence, but also 
because of its ability to encode a particular protein.207  Under 
the holding of Enzo II, a scientist seeking to patent a DNA 
sequence that encodes a particular protein would need to 
disclose every other degenerate DNA capable of encoding the 
same protein.  If she failed to do so, synthesizing a distinct 
DNA that encodes the exact same protein could easily 
circumvent her patent.208 
If an inventor provides sufficient instructions so that the 
public can readily make and use a genus of DNAs, she should 
be entitled to claim this genus.  In Enzo II, the acceptability of 
claims to subsequences of the deposited sequences should have 
been judged by whether the disclosure was enabling.  This 
stipulation, combined with the other substantive patenting 
requirements (e.g., novelty), accurately contains the scope of 
the invention to that which has been taught to the public.209  It 
makes little sense to deny protection simply because the precise 
DNA sequences have not been laboriously recited on paper.  
Enablement provides a fair measure of claim scope; there is no 
need for an arbitrary and inflexible second standard.210  If 
Enzo’s disclosure does not teach the ordinary scientist how fully 
to make and use the inventions, the claims are properly 
rejected as involving undue experimentation.211 

 206. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Robert A. Hodges, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a “Mere 
Wish or Plan” Should Be Considered an Adequate Description of the Invention, 
17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 831, 857-858 (2001). 
 211. See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text. 
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A rigorous structural focus ignores the truly innovative 
elements of a DNA invention and effectively treats each 
individual nucleotide as a separate claim element.  While a 
fixed structural requirement freezes the technology at a level 
already exceeded by today’s methods, the enablement standard 
allows the adequacy of the disclosure to evolve with the effort 
required to carry out the described process.  Cloning genes from 
amino acid sequences, even partial sequences, is increasingly 
routine.212  Determining the function of a protein or DNA is the 
truly innovative work. 213   The current written description 
requirement rewards those who master basic technical 
procedures, rather than those who extend the boundaries of 
biology. 
2. Benefits of the Enablement Standard 
The inadequate patent protection currently afforded DNA 
inventions discourages the public disclosure of new discoveries.  
For example, consider the options of a company like Enzo 
making the same discovery while cognizant of the heightened 
written description requirement at the time of invention.  Even 
though the claims to the deposited sequences were allowed, the 
invention is worthless without inclusion of the claims to 
subsequences and subtle mutations.214  A competitor needs only 
to obtain the sequence of the unique DNAs from the patent 
specification or depository and select a smaller probe from 
within the disclosed sequence that functions equivalently.  
Faced with this degree of protection from a patent, Enzo will be 
better served by keeping the knowledge as a trade secret or 
attempting to develop a method to conceal the sequence of the 
probe from the end user.  Neither of these options will result in 
a meaningful public disclosure that fulfills the constitutional 
mandate to further the sciences.215 
Use of the enablement standard as the sole measure of 
disclosure, in contrast, provides claim coverage commensurate 
with what has been added to the public domain.216  This result 

 212. See, e.g., Yuji Yamanashi & David Baltimore, Identification of the Abl- 
and rasGAP-Associated 62 kDa Protein as a Docking Protein, Dok, 88 CELL 
205, 209 (1997) (detailing a procedure for the cloning of a mammalian gene 
from peptide sequences derived from an isolated protein). 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 135-136 
 215. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text. 
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is fair to inventors and not only provides incentive for 
innovation, but also encourages the disclosure of new 
discoveries so that the public may benefit from and build upon 
them. 
The enablement standard would also promote greater 
harmony between the PTO and the Federal Circuit.  Under the 
current system, the Federal Circuit promulgates rules on what 
constitutes an adequate written description and the PTO 
attempts to faithfully translate these rules into workable 
protocols for examiners.217  Use of only the enablement doctrine 
obviates the need for this constant updating process as the 
standard is flexible and evolves with the very technology being 
assessed.  The PTO and the courts would be making the same 
judgment and applying the same standard: whether the 
disclosure is sufficient to enable one to make and use the 
invention.  Though each institution’s interpretation of what 
disclosure is enabling may deviate slightly over time, the 
Federal Circuit can still make subtle corrections to PTO 
procedure through its decisions.  Because the enablement 
standard varies with the technological capabilities at the time 
in question, the awkward task of shoehorning state of the art 
inventions into judicial categories based on decades-old 
conceptions will be avoided.  The Federal Circuit’s subsequent 
rulings are thus less likely to be antipodal to PTO decisions, 
and patents granted by the PTO are less likely to be later held 
invalid for failure to comply with unforeseen disclosure 
requirements. 
Finally, the enablement standard is based on well-settled 
case law, which provides the clarity and certainty required by 
the patent-dependent biotechnology industry. 218   Because 
compliance with the enablement requirement is a question of 
law, trial outcomes are likely to be more predictable than jury-
decided written description issues.219  In the end, even if the 
Federal Circuit had invalidated Enzo’s claims for lack of 
enablement, Enzo might well have foreseen this problem 
through its own analysis of the adequacy of the patent’s 
disclosure.  However, because Enzo’s patent was issued almost 

 217. See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Sasha Blaug, et al., Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe: Complying with 
the Written Description Requirement under US Patent Law, 21 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 97, 98 (2003). 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 117-120. 
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eight years prior to the Eli Lilly decision,220 the company was 
powerless to either predict or prevent potentially invalidating 
deficiencies arising from the new written description doctrine.  
Unless the heightened written description requirement is 
shelved in the near future, one can only speculate how many 
other patentees will fall into this trap. 
IV.CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit has long struggled with the application 
of the written description requirement to biotechnology 
inventions, and considerable confusion surrounds exactly what 
it takes to satisfy the requirement.  The court missed the 
opportunity to clarify the doctrine in the rehearing of Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.  The court correctly held that a 
biological deposit and a reference to the accession number of 
the deposit in the specification can be used to demonstrate 
possession of an invention.  At the same time, however, the 
court maintained the previously held view that possession 
alone will not meet the written description requirement.  The 
larger question of which functional descriptions are adequate 
remains unanswered. 
The Federal Circuit should take the next available 
opportunity to overrule the Eli Lilly decision through an en 
banc hearing and return enablement as the sole substantive 
disclosure requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.  The 
heightened written description standard applied to 
biotechnology inventions after Eli Lilly ignores fundamental 
biological principles and focuses too much attention on the 
structure of a DNA or protein.  In addition, the standard is 
inflexible to technological changes and requires constant 
updating that leads to uncertainty over patent validity.  
Finally, the heightened requirement fails to meet the 
constitutional purpose behind the patent laws by discouraging 
full disclosure of biological inventions.  Simply returning to the 
enablement disclosure standard that was in effect prior to Eli 
Lilly would solve the bulk of these problems. 

 220. See U.S. Pat. No. 4,900,659, supra note 2. 
